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THE DIALECTICS OF TRUST AND SUSPICION 
Patricia A. Sayre 
In this paper I discuss implications of the post modern critique of transcen-
dence for our understanding of the philosophical enterprise, focusing in par-
ticular on its implications for Christian philosophy. I take for granted that 
standards of rationality are embedded in cultural matrices, and look at trust 
and suspicion as two quite different attitudes one can adopt given the con-
tingency this implies. I argue that both trust and suspicion are important in 
philosophy, but while an attitude making trust more fundamental than suspi-
cion is crucial to a religious sensibility, an attitude making suspicion more 
fundamental than trust is antithetical to it. 
I 
Captain .... Moral: don't believe in anyone too much. 
Doctor. Don't believe too little either.! 
-August Strindberg, The Father 
Nietzsche has recently been gaining ground as an intellectual hero among 
contemporary philosophers, especially among those philosophers who de-
scribe themselves as postmodernists. It was Nietzsche, these philosophers 
say, who first saw clearly that there is no such thing as a claim free of cultural, 
historical, or personal bias. This being the case, it is foolish for philosophers 
to invest time and energy in the old-fashioned task of formulating and justi-
fying universal principles. Instead of constructing elaborate justifications for 
such principles, their new task is to become as suspicious as possible of all 
such justifications, deconstructing them and undermining their pretensions to 
universality by showing them to be informed by hidden cultural biases. 
The postmodern idea that suspicion is important to philosophy has an 
ancient lineage. It has long been part of the philosophical enterprise to suspect 
there is more to what people say than they are willing readily to admit, and 
our sense that Socrates is the first truly great philosopher in the western 
tradition has much to do with his uncanny ability to ask uncomfortable ques-
tions that unearth previously unnoticed assumptions. Furthermore, a careful 
reading of both Plato and Aristotle suggests neither is a stranger to nor enemy 
of the idea that rationality both theoretical and practical makes sense only 
within a specific cultural context. There is, nonetheless, a radical difference 
between modeling one's philosophical style on Socrates and modeling it on 
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Nietzsche. Socrates knows how to use suspicion in his role as an effective 
gadfly, but Socrates is more than a gadfly. He is also a midwife. He holds 
out to his interlocutors the promise that if they trust him to coach them 
through their labor, there is a chance they will give birth to ideas that are not 
mere windeggs. Thus in the Platonic dialogues suspicion arises and is dealt 
with in the context of trust. In Nietzsche's philosophy, on the other hand, the 
relationship between trust and suspicion is reversed. Nietzsche seduces his 
readers, doing everything in his power to engage their trust, while at the same 
time doing everything in his power to induce a profound sense of unease. The 
deeper one goes into one of Nietzsche's texts, the more suspicious one is of 
the world around one-a world that is tainted through and through by self-
interest and cultural prejudice. To have a perspective on the world at all may 
well require taking something or other on trust, but for the Nietzschean the 
trust is shallow and framed by suspicion. 
My own view is that both trust and suspicion are necessary elements in 
intellectual life, but that an attitude that makes suspicion more fundamental 
than trust is not at all the same as one which makes trust more fundamental 
than suspicion. The former way of understanding the relationship between 
suspicion and trust is quite antithetical to a religious sensibility, while the 
latter way is, it seems to me, quite crucial to a religious sensibility. Thus it 
is no accident that, while comparisons are often drawn between Socrates and 
Jesus, Nietzsche sees Christianity as a hypocritical lie. My aim in this paper 
is to explore further this dialectic between trust and suspicion. More specifi-
cally, I want to take it for granted that standards of rationality and morality 
are always embedded in cultural matrices and thus are always in some im-
portant sense contingent, and then look at suspicion and trust as two funda-
mentally different attitudes one can adopt in the face of this contingency. My 
primary concern will be with how the dialectic between these two attitudes 
works in philosophy, and, in particular, what it portends for Christian phi-
losophy in a postmodern age. 
II 
The little god 0' the world sticks to the same old way, 
And is as whimsical as on Creation's day. 
Life somewhat better might content him, 
But for thc gleam of heavenly light that thou hast lent him: 
He calls it Reason-thence his power's increased, 
To be far beastlier than any beast. 
-Goethe, Faust, Prologue in Heaven2 
Before providing my analyses of trust and suspicion, I want to offer a quick 
sketch of some key themes in postmodern thought and report briefly on what 
at least some postmodern thinkers have been saying about the future of 
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philosophy. The term 'postmodernism' is used in a wide variety of contexts. 3 
Architects write books on post modern design, and artists struggle to articulate 
a postmodern aesthetic. Literary critics supply postmodern readings of post-
modern texts. Pundits and politicians talk about the social challenges of life 
in a postmodern culture. And philosophers and theologians worry about the 
survival of their disciplines in a postmodern age. 
Postmodernisms are as diverse as the modernisms they reject. Postmodern 
architecture is premised on a rejection of the principles of modern design 
developed by the Bauhaus school, while in social theory, postmodernism 
involves a rejection of the abstract and totalizing economic and political 
systems characteristic of modern societies. In literature and the visual arts, 
postmodernism is premised on a rejection of formalist modes of interpretation 
and representation, while in philosophical and theological circles, post mod-
ernism is a rejection of the ideals and aspirations informing the period we 
now call 'modern philosophy,' a period that began with Descartes and culmi-
nated in Kant. At the heart of all these rejected modernisms is the attempt to 
achieve something transcending cultural, historical, and personal bias. In 
architecture and the arts, for example, modernists aspire to create artifacts so 
thoroughly self-referential that the context in which they are produced or 
displayed becomes irrelevant. Thus we get box-like buildings in the Interna-
tional Style, whose design can be replicated everywhere because it makes no 
special accommodations anywhere, and abstract paintings so resolute in their 
refusal to point beyond themselves that they simply are what they are-paint 
on canvas-no matter where they are hung. In social theory, on the other 
hand, we get a distinction between modern and primitive societies that has 
much to do with the degree to which a society is able to measure its well-be-
ing in quantitative terms. Here too there is an attempt at transcendence, and 
a faith that personal and cultural biases can be shed by speaking the language 
of numbers. Although the conviction that this language is the key to a proper 
understanding of modern social structures did not come into full flower until 
our own century, it had its roots in the mathematical turn the natural sciences 
took several centuries earlier. Coincident with this turn came the grandest 
modernist project of them all: the heroic attempt of the modern philosopher 
to legitimate laws both scientific and moral through the transcendental exer-
cise of pure reason. 
If modernism in every instance involves an attempt to transcend the par-
ticulars of time and place and escape cultural bias, then postmodernism is the 
rejection of this "transcendental pretense." 4 For postmodern philosophers, 
this means rejecting the claims their predecessors made on behalf of pure 
reason and insisting that all our reasonings, and indeed the very standards we 
employ as we reason, are contingent on the complex cultural matrices within 
which they take place. This shift away from transcendental reason toward 
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embedded reason has the effect of politicizing reason: "postmodernists urge 
us to recognize the highest ideals of modernity in the West as immanent to a 
specific historical time and geographical region and also associated with 
certain political baggage."5 The model of rationality passed down to us by 
modern thinkers thus reflects the power struggles that characterized the emer-
gence of modernity. Had less power been yielded to those working in the 
natural sciences, the sorts of evidence we find compelling might be radically 
different; had women held more powerful positions in the culture, a sharp 
distinction between the rational and the affective might be much less a part 
of our intellectual lives; had antagonisms between Reformers and the Church 
taken a different turn, we might place far less emphasis on the individual 
knower and far more on the community of knowers; and so on. 
The politicizing of reason raises important questions about the role of 
philosophy in a postmodern age. There is a long tradition, going back at least 
to Plato, that distinguishes philosophers from political power brokers; phi-
losophy is not to be confused with sophistry, for philosophers are concerned 
not with power but with truth, and, more specifically, with a kind of truth 
that transcends the political maneuvers of the day. Now, if the transcendence 
sought by modern philosophers reflects a core aspiration of the entire western 
tradition, then rejecting this aspiration is a very serious matter indeed, for it 
amounts to rejecting the entire tradition. And so we can see why some con-
temporary philosophers have felt forced to draw the discomfiting conclusion 
that with the dawning of the postmodern age the history of their discipline 
has come to a close.6 
Before moving too quickly to the conclusion that philosophy has no place 
in a postmodern world we should pause to consider the following. First, the 
notion that the entire western tradition can be summed up in terms of a single 
core aspiration is surely oversimple. It may even be oversimple as a reading 
of the period we call modern. If so, rejecting the urge to transcendence need 
not mean rejecting the entire tradition of western philosophical thought. In-
stead of proclaiming the end of philosophy one might instead call for its 
transformation: philosophy has a role to play in a postmodern age, but be-
cause the postmodern age is a different age than the modern, its role will be 
different. As I see it, taking seriously the postmodern claim that our reasoning 
is always embedded in complex cultural matrices does not require, and in 
fact prohibits, adopting the extreme view that philosophy has come to an end. 
Here I can do no better than quote Derrida, who despite frequent billing as 
a partisan of the extreme view, quite sensibly points out that critiques of 
philosophy "still belong to our western culture and so are never totally free 
from the marks of philosophicallanguage."7 The notion that we can cease to 
do philosophy when we live in a culture so mightily shaped by the philo-
sophical efforts of our predecessors has all the marks of yet another attempt 
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to transcend our cultural milieu by shedding all our cultural baggage over-
night. Appealing to postmodern thought to argue we have come to the end of 
philosophy thus violates a key postmodern insight. 
Although taking seriously the postmodern critique of transcendence does 
not require and even militates against the view that philosophy has come to 
an end, it may still require thinking seriously about ways in which philosophy 
needs to be transformed. For the remainder of this paper I will take it as given 
that philosophy is not about to disappear any time soon. My concern will thus 
be with ways we might transform our ideas about what philosophy has to 
teach us. If we are in fact feeling our way toward a new paradigm in philoso-
phy, then it is hardly surprising that we should take a special interest in the 
work of those philosophers in our recent past who see themselves as making 
a radical break with tradition. My guess is that one reason for the recent 
revival of interest in Nietzsche's philosophy is our fascination with his claim 
to have seen a new species of philosopher "coming up over the horizon."8 
This new philosopher, Nietzsche seemed to think, will come at the world with 
a fundamentally different attitude than earlier philosophers: an attitude of 
suspicion. I want now to turn to a closer examination of this link between 
suspicion and philosophy, beginning with a brief analysis of suspicion, and 
then moving on to consider how suspicion might serve to transform philosophy. 
III 
'You're probably right,' Leighton said. 'As soon as something 
looks suspicious, everything looks suspicious .... '9 
-Amanda Cross, No Word from Winifred 
Suspicion takes many forms. It can be directed at a specific proposition, as 
when we say we suspect that something or other is the case, or it can be 
directed at a person or situation, as when we say we are suspicious of some-
one's motives or some plan of action. When I say I suspect that something 
is so (as opposed to saying I believe or know it is so) this may be a way of 
indicating that my attitude toward the relevant proposition is somewhat ten-
tative. On some occasions, it may also be a way of warning the person to 
whom I am speaking that I am about to assert something the truth of which 
would run counter to normal expectations. When I say I am suspicious of 
someone, the question of whether a given proposition is true or false may not 
even arise, for to be suspicious of a person or plan of action it is not necessary 
to suspect that something or other is the case. I can, for example, be suspi-
cious of you even if I know relatively little about you and thus am entirely 
incapable of saying what it is that makes me so uneasy in your presence. On 
the other hand, while 'suspicion of' is not itself a propositional attitude, it 
supplies an attitudinal context which can give rise to relevant propositional 
attitudes. Being suspicious of you can serve to make me more attentive to 
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details of your behavior than I would be otherwise, and I may eventually 
come to believe I have seen through your ostensible motives to the real 
motives lurking beneath the surface. I may also conclude that this puts me in a 
better position to exercise control over you, and my having this belief may in 
itself be enough to alter significantly the balance of power in our relationship. 
Let us now consider what it might mean for suspicion to supply a context 
for the philosophical enterprise. Paul Ricoeur identifies Nietzsche, along with 
Freud and Marx, as one of the great 'masters of the school of suspicion.' He 
writes that 
If we go back to the intention they had in common, we find in it the decision 
to look upon the whole of consciousness primarily as 'false conscious-
ness' .... What all three attempted to do was to make their 'conscious meth-
ods' of deciphering coincide with the 'unconscious' work of ciphering which 
they attributed to the will of power, to social being, to the unconscious 
psychism .... The man of suspicion carries out in reverse the work of falsifi-
cation of the man of guile. 10 
For Nietzsche, the 'man of suspicion' is none other than the new philosopher 
he spies coming over the horizon. This new philosopher, he claims, has a 
"duty to be mistrustful, to squint most maliciously from every abyss of sus-
picion. "11 Suspicion, then, is a moral calling; it is the only attitude one can 
responsibly adopt given that "the fallaciousness of the world in which we 
think and live is the firmest and most certain thing that meets our eye. "12 
The suspicion Nietzsche describes here is a radically generalized version 
of the 'suspicion of' described earlier. It does not merely color our relations 
with another person; it colors our experience of the world as a whole. Pressing 
the analogy to 'suspicion of,' we can think of Nietzsche's generalized suspi-
cion as a habit of mind keeping us alert to details and dissonances, highlight-
ing breaks in the patterns that shape our experience while simultaneously 
stimulating us to see new patterns in those breaks. But if we generalize 
suspicion so radically that, as Ricoeur puts it, we suspect "the whole of 
consciousness," these new patterns also become suspect. Our philosophical 
deciphering become every bit as much an exercise of the will to power as the 
nonphilosophical ciphers they address. Philosophy can no longer lay any 
claim to have transcended issues of power so as to deal solely with issues of 
truth. The distinction between truth and power falls away as irrelevant and 
the distinction between sophistry and philosophy collapses. 
Adopting radical suspicion as a fundamental attitude toward the world thus 
brings us to just the place the postmodern philosopher claims we should be. 
But if philosophy is simply a matter of offering new ciphers in place of old, 
is there any reason for us to continue to bother with it? Here the philosopher 
of suspicion might respond by pointing out that the urge to transcend is strong 
and is unlikely to be eliminated from human affairs any time soon. As long 
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as this urge persists, we will need philosophers trained in the art of puncturing 
its pretensions. Suspicion aids philosophers in this task by increasing their 
sensitivity to elements that jar and putting them on the alert to hidden biases. 
In pointing out these biases, the philosopher will, of course, also be working 
from a biased position. But this, rather than spelling the doom of philosophy, 
guarantees its future: philosophy as critique supplies endless fodder for 
further critique. 
So far my discussion of philosophy and suspicion has been primarily de-
scriptive. I want now to offer some evaluative remarks. First, it should be 
obvious by this point that the themes informing postmodern philosophy are 
not entirely new in the history of western thought. Postmodern thinkers may 
be more extreme in their claims about the degree to which our very standards 
of reason are biased then previous skeptics and relativists have been, but the 
challenges they pose to the ideal of transcendent reason have been around a 
long time. We find similar challenges posed in the Platonic dialogues, and, 
in those same dialogues, we find strategies for responding to them. The most 
popular of these strategies is to point out that attacks on transcendence in-
evitably run into self-referential difficulties. We can thus imagine an objec-
tion to postmodernism that goes something like this: Postmodern 
philosophers claim that transcendence is impossible and that all our claims 
are tainted by cultural bias. If they intend this claim about cultural bias to be 
unbiased, they are caught in a logical inconsistency, for they are making a 
claim to transcendence at the same time as they are claiming transcendence 
is impossible. On the other hand, if they allow that their claim is biased, we 
have no reason to pay more heed to it than to opposing claims. But surely 
the claim was put forward with the intention that it be heeded; thus putting 
forward the claim that all our claims are biased, where this claim is itself 
biased, is a self-defeating exercise. 
While there may be something to this objection, I do not find it entirely 
satisfying. To explain where I think it falls short, I want to consider briefly 
the effectiveness of accusing adherents of classical skepticism of self-refer-
ential incoherence, looking at both Academic and Pyrrhonic skepticism. 13 The 
Academic skeptic claims to have arguments by which we can come to know 
that nothing can be known. Here the charge of self-referential incoherence 
has considerable bite, for in this case the skeptic engages in the activity of 
argumentation with the clear intention of supplying knowledge at the same 
time as, if successful, he or she makes knowledge impossible. The situation 
is rather different in the case of Pyrrhonism. Here arguments are given to the 
effect that we cannot know whether anything can be known, not with the 
intention of supplying knowledge, but with the intention of inducing ataraxia, 
an attitude of tranquility and unperturbedness in which we cease to strive 
after knowledge. Now, it might be that the Pyrrhonist's arguments turn out 
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to be poor devices for inducing the desired state of mind, but this is to accuse 
the Pyrrhonist of a rather different sort of failure than a failure of logical 
. coherence. Indeed, there is a sense in which the logical coherence of the 
Pyrrhonist's arguments is neither here nor there as long as they produce the 
desired attitudinal effect. Furthermore, to those who object that putting for-
ward arguments at all runs counter to the goal of achieving ataraxia, Pyr-
rhonists can reply as Sextus Empiricus did, and ask their objectors to view 
their arguments as ladders that those who strive after knowledge are obliged 
to take seriously, but ladders which once climbed are to be kicked away. 
Understood in this fashion, there is a sense in which the Pyrrhonist's activity 
of offering arguments is self-defeating, but it is a form of self-defeat condu-
cive to achieving the desired rhetorical end. 
It seems to me that postmodern philosophers of suspicion are engaging in 
a Pyrrhonic rather than an Academic activity. That is, their claims are put 
forward primarily to induce or reinforce a certain attitude toward the world. 
This being the case charges of logical incoherence simply miss the point. All 
that matters is that making these claims proves useful in cultivating the 
desired attitude. If these claims provoke the response that they reflect the 
biases of a post modern culture, this is all to the good, as it indicates the seeds 
of suspicion are being successfully sown. Furthermore, the fact that these 
claims are biased does not mean they can be ignored. The postmodern rejec-
tion of transcendence is presented not simply as an abstract thesis about the 
limitations of rationality, but as a moral drawn from quite detailed and ex-
tensive work critically examining the biases inherent in the projects of mod-
ernity. Here, as a prime example, one might think of the work of cultural 
historian Michel Foucault. Or, consider the work of contemporary feminists 
like Carol Gilligan, who are reimagining rationality to reflect biases in 
women's patterns of thought rather than men's. These postmodern thinkers 
may not themselves transcend bias, but they are raising questions about bias 
that anyone who claims to reason from a transcendent point of view cannot 
responsibly ignore. 
Suppose we grant our models of rationality are bound to be biased by the 
cultural context in which they are employed, and that philosophy is indeed 
served by and servant of generalized attitudes toward the world. This stili 
leaves us with the question of why philosophers should cultivate this attitude 
rather than that. Having granted the postmodern philosopher as much as we 
have, we are forced to acknowledge that any attempt to offer a universally 
acceptable justification of the desirability of a particular attitude is bound to 
fail. But just as the inevitable embeddedness of rationality has not prevented 
feminist philosophers from trying to imagine alternative modes of rationality, 
so the impossibility of offering a universally acceptable defense of one atti-
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tudinal context over another need not prevent us from trying to imagine 
alternative attitudinal contexts for philosophy. This is what I want to do in 
the section that follows, where 1 consider trust as a generalized attitude that 
can serve and be served by philosophy. 
IV 
... the clever one desires by the help of evasions to have strength in advance. 
He wishes to misuse it like the soldier who, in order to be sure of being 
distinguished in battle, demands his distinction in advance. And yet this 
picture is untrue, for it is doubtful how far the battle gives strength. But it is 
certain, that the confidence, wherewith he has ventured, does give superhu-
man strength. Yet it is also certain (oh wonderful accuracy!) that the one who 
does not have trust does not receive this strength. 14 
- S~ren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing 
Trust, like suspicion, can be construed as a propositional attitude. When I say 
'I trust that the bank is still open' I assume the proposition 'The bank is still 
open' is a true description of a particular state of affairs. Saying I trust that 
this is so, rather than that 1 believe or know it is so, can be a way of reassuring 
my hearer that I am familiar with the bank and its hours of business. It can 
also be a way of conveying my belief that the bank is still open while at the 
same time indicating I have no direct evidence that this is so. Trust that 
something is the case thus seems to presume a certain degree of familiarity 
with the relevant circumstances while also leaving open the possibility that 
circumstances with which one is unfamiliar may prove one wrong. Trust in 
differs from trust that in being directed at an agent rather than a proposition. 
The agent can be personal (,I trust in you to do what is best') or impersonal 
('I trust in fate to work matters out for the best'). Trust in an agent need not 
be bound up with specific expectations about what that agent will do. Trust 
in fate to work matters out for the best implies a willingness to construe a 
wide variety of outcomes as ultimately serving some beneficent end. Simi-
larly, trust in other persons to do what is best is often compatible with their 
acting in a wide variety of ways, many of which could not have been antici-
pated in advance. The deeper my trust in you, the more freedom I will give 
you to act as you see fit and the less dependent my trust will be on your 
acting in a way 1 could have foreseen. The power relations set up by trust are 
thus quite different from those put into play by suspicion; to trust in someone 
is to give power over to them rather than to try to gain power over them. 
We can get some idea of what it might mean to do philosophy in a context 
of trust by looking at the relationship between Socrates and his interlocutors. 
In a famous passage in the Theaetetus, Socrates offers a lengthy description 
of himself as an intellectual midwife. Along the way, he makes it clear that 
he cannot practice his skills on just anyone: 
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Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and allay in those who 
consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day 
they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of women. 
So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me appar-
ently not in a state of pregnancy; and as I know that they have no need of 
my art, I coax them into marrying someone, and by the grace of God I can 
generally tell who is likely to do them some good. Many of them I have given 
away to Prodicus and many to other inspired sages. i5 
Socrates concludes the passage by telling Theaetetus he is a young man who 
appears to be pregnant with some great conception. This is not, however, 
always the case with Socrates' interlocutors. 
Consider, for example, Meno. When an impatient Meno comes blustering 
up to Socrates, demanding to know whether virtue can be taught, Socrates 
refuses to answer that question until they answer the prior question of what 
virtue is. When Meno takes a stab at defining virtue Socrates quickly reduces 
him to perplexity and the whole discussion threatens to run aground on a 
sophistical paradox. Socrates then calls over a slave boy and shows Meno 
how one reduced to perplexity can be brought into clarity. He proposes to do 
the same for Meno, but Meno refuses to follow the example of the slave boy, 
insisting on bypassing the difficult business of trying to define virtue, to 
return to the question of whether it can be taught. Socrates yields to Meno, 
saying he cannot do otherwise seeing as Meno can think of nothing but trying 
to control him. From that point on, the dialogue is an exercise in pure soph-
istry, complete with poetic praises extolling the Sophists as teachers of virtue. 
Meno has clearly been found unfit for the practice of philosophy and has, as 
it were, been "given away to Prodicus." 
Now contrast Meno with Theaetetus. From the start Theaetetus is willing 
to put himself in Socrates' hands, saying that if he should make a mistake 
along the way in their discussion, he is sure Socrates will set him right. With 
Theaetetus there is no impatience and no rush, but time for lengthy digres-
sions. Theaetetus commits himself to the long haul, and is willing to follow 
the discussion wherever it may lead. His first attempt to define knowledge 
pulls on that which is familiar and close to hand-perception-but as the 
dialogue proceeds he launches out into less familiar territory, until by the 
end, he says, he has given utterance to more than he knew he had in him. 
Although he and Socrates are no more successful in arriving at a definition 
of knowledge than Socrates and Meno were in arriving at a definition of 
virtue, Theaetetus is not handed over to the Sophists, but rather, to the 
Stranger. In the sequel dialogue to the Theaetetus, the Sophist, Theaetetus 
and the Stranger not only succeed in defining the terms they set out to define, 
but, along the way, clear up various confusions about the nature of false 
judgment that had been problematic in the earlier discussion with Socrates. 
Notice how much depends here on the attitudes each of these interlocutors 
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brings to their relationship with Socrates. Meno appears on the scene ready 
to engage in a battle with Socrates; throughout the dialogue he does his best 
to impose his own agenda on the conversation. Theaetetus, on the other hand, 
is willing to trust Socrates to take the conversation where he thinks best. 
Rather than eyeing Socrates suspiciously across a battlefield. Theaetetus en-
trusts himself to Socrates in the way that patients entrust themselves to their 
physicians. And though all the children Theaetetus gives birth to under Soc-
rates' care turn out to be windeggs, his labor has not been in vain-for, as 
Socrates says at the end of the dialogue, their exercise together will at the 
very least serve to make Theaetetus more gentle with those around him and 
less apt to think he knows something he does not. 
So far, then, we have a vision of philosophy that does not seem to violate 
the postmodern strictures against the transcendental pretense. As was the case 
for a philosophy of suspicion, Socratic philosophy has its end, or so it seems, 
in the cultivation of a particular attitude toward the world. The arguments 
Socrates offers serve a rhetorical purpose, and the measure of their success 
is the impact they have on the way Theaetetus carries on in his own quite 
specific cultural context. But Theaetetus' interactions with Socrates are not 
the end of the story. Socrates includes among his skills as midwife a talent 
for matchmaking. Meno he consigns to the Sophists, but Theaetetus is put in 
the hands of a master dialectician. Clearly Plato, unlike the philosopher of 
suspicion, makes a distinction between sophistry and philosophy. Socrates 
himself is neither sophist nor philosopher, but something between the two-
the sophist of noble lineage. Although he does not explicitly name him, 
Socrates is clearly the 'purifier of the soul' the Stranger has in mind when 
he tells Theaetetus that 
as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking 
food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the 
soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application 
of knowledge until he is refuted and from his refutation learns modesty; he 
must be purged of his prejudice first and made to think that he knows only 
what he knows, and no more. 16 
Thus although Socrates, operating on the turf midway between sophistry and 
philosophy, cannot himself give Theaetetus knowledge, he can prepare 
Theaetetus to "benefit from the application of knowledge" once he is put in 
the hands of the true philosopher. 
At this point it may seem we have left postmodernism behind and returned 
to just the vision of philosophy we earlier rejected. The notion that we can 
be 'purged of our prejudices' and go on from there to acquire knowledge 
seems diametrically opposed to the postmodern insistence that all our claims 
to knowledge are tainted by biases of one sort or another. But I am inclined 
to think the version of the philosophical enterprise we see on display in the 
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Platonic dialogues is not as antithetical to postmodern thought as it at first 
appears. In these dialogues everything hangs on the attitudinal context in 
which discourse is carried out. We can see this when we compare the way 
things go for Socrates' various interlocutors, but we also have the words of 
Plato himself in the Seventh Letter to consider. There he makes it clear that 
"close companionship" and "benevolent disputation by the use of question 
and answer without jealousy" are necessary preconditions for that flash of 
understanding that blazes up when the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the 
limits of human capacity, is flooded with light.17 But now what about that 
flash? Have we here just another example of the transcendental pretense? 
Perhaps so. But it is worth noting that the understanding that blazes up is 
nondiscursive: "there is no way of putting it in words like other studies."18 
Thus we still have an understanding of philosophical discourse as serving a 
non discursive end. 
Whatever Plato himself may have had in mind here, I think we can use the 
material he gives us in his dialogues to construct an alternative to the phi-
losophy of suspicion that need not violate the postmodern strictures against 
transcendence, but which at the same time does not collapse the distinction 
between philosophy and sophistry. When I read the Sophist, it often seems to 
me that what is going on there can be read as surprisingly Wittgensteinian in 
spirit. In the first segment of the dialogue, Theaetetus and the Stranger re-
peatedly apply the method of collection and division to produce a quite 
thorough map of the various uses of the term 'Sophist' that were abroad in 
Athenian culture. A number of definitions are offered that taken together 
display to very good effect the family resemblances between these various 
uses. A closer look at these definitions, however, leads them into confusions 
of a sort that even then had a long philosophical pedigree-confusions 
Theaetetus had earlier shown himself prey to in his discussion with Socrates. 
There then follows a lengthy exploration of the philosophical language game 
surrounding the use of terms like 'being' and 'nonbeing.' The confusions are 
eventually dispelled, and a final definition of the sophist is offered that both 
Theaetetus and the Stranger find satisfactory. 
If we allow this description of what is going on in the Sophist, we have a 
model for doing philosophy that does not pretend to a perspective of tran-
scendence, but is distinctly grounded in a particular linguistic framework that 
at least in some respects could have been other than it was. The job of the 
philosopher is to clarify usage, uncovering sources of confusion and elimi-
nating them so that we might, as the Stranger puts it, reach an explicit 
agreement about the definition of our terms. The precondition for this 
achievement in the Sophist is the attitude of trust Theaetetus brought to the 
conversation, an attitude that was initially present but which was also culti-
vated in his interaction with Socrates. By trusting Socrates, Theaetetus was 
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purged of his prejudices, not in the sense that he was removed from his 
cultural context and set loose on the exalted plane of pure reason, but in the 
sense that he was made ready for the kind of give and take that allows one 
to form explicit agreements with others. In The Man Without Qualities Robert 
Musil describes one of his characters as "longing to talk, for once, to some-
body with whom he could wholly agree ... then the words are drawn out of 
the breast by some mysterious power and none of them misses its mark."19 
In the Sophist, much turns not only on the mutual trust between Theaetetus 
and the Stranger, but on the fact that together they are willing to trust the 
"mysterious power" of dialectic to draw out their words. They are not merely 
reaching an agreement between the two of them as to how to use their words, 
but are exploring a larger language game that places various constraints on 
them and acts as a corrective when they take a wrong turn. It is this sense 
that one can be corrected that is missing from the discourse of the Sophist. 
The Sophists, the Stranger says, engage in a "shadow play of discourse" 
which they impose upon the young, but, he goes on to ask, is it not "inevitable 
that, after a long enough time, as these hearers advance in age ... all the 
illusions created in discourse will be completely overturned by the realities 
that encounter them in the actual conduct of lifeT20 The implication here is 
that if the Stranger and Theaetetus succeed in moving beyond shadow play 
to arrive at a definition of the Sophist that "hits the mark," it will not be 
because their words have somehow magically flown free from their linguistic 
context to attach themselves to a transcendent reality, but because their words 
can now be used to communicate without producing confusion in the actual 
conduct of their lives. 
v 
Understanding oneself properly is difficult, because an action to which one 
might be prompted by good, generous motives is something one may also be 
doing out of cowardice or indifference. Certainly, one may be acting in such 
and such a way out of genuine love, but equally well out of deceitfulness, or 
a cold heart. Just as not all gentleness is a form of goodness. And only if I 
were able to submerge myself in religion could these doubts be stilled. Be-
cause only religion would have the power to destroy vanity and penetrate all 
the nooks and crannies. 21 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 
At this point we have considered two quite different attitudinal contexts 
for philosophy. In describing these two attitudes I appealed (quite selectively 
and somewhat idiosyncratically) to works by both Nietzsche and Plato. Both 
these philosophers are, of course, far more complex than I have let on, and, 
similarly, so is the current state of postmodern discourse. Postmodern dis-
course is not by any means universally a discourse of suspicion. For every 
Richard Rorty who wants to transform philosophy into an ironical enterprise, 
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there is an Emmanuel Levinas who wants philosophy to open us up to "the 
infinity of the other who transcends every attempt to reduce him to our 
totalizing grasp."22 The situation is further complicated by those postmodern 
philosophers who veer back and forth between a philosophy of suspicion and 
a philosophy of trust. There is Derrida the philosopher of suspicion for whom 
"the only justification for transforming philosophy into a specialized disci-
pline is the necessity to render explicit and thematic the philosophical subtext 
in every discourse."23 And there is Derrida the philosopher of trust for whom 
deconstruction is "a positive response to an alterity ... a vocation-a response 
to a call .... The other precedes philosophy and necessarily invokes and pro-
vokes the subject before any questioning can begin."24 
Perhaps the moral we should draw here is that both trust and suspicion have 
a role to play in postmodern philosophy. The important question is whether 
suspicion is to provide the attitudinal context for trust or vice versa. To 
engage in discourse at all one must invest a minimal degree of trust in what 
one is doing. One must, for example, trust that the words one chooses will 
have certain sorts of effects. Yet this trust, if colored by an attitude of suspi-
cion, is shallow and does not leave much room for "hitting the mark" in the 
way Musil describes. "Man," to quote Musil again, "is a being that can no 
more stand up to suspicion than tissue paper up to rain."25 The same could 
be said of our philosophical discourse when it takes place in a context of 
suspicion. Instead of conceiving of philosophy as teaching us to suspect what 
we trust, however, we might reverse the formula and conceive of philosophy 
as teaching us to trust what we suspect. Philosophical discourse, on this 
reading, is an attempt to articulate our suspicions regarding the implications 
of our beliefs. By trusting these suspicions, we allow ourselves to be drawn 
along in directions we could not have previously anticipated, raising puzzles 
that, once worked through, might bring us a clarity regarding our own forms 
of life which otherwise would have eluded us. 
But now what does all this imply for Christian philosophy in a postmodern 
age? The view that philosophy should provoke us to suspect that which we 
trust closes in on itself in a way that strikes me as being incompatible with 
a Christian perspective on the world. In the first place, philosophy done in 
this way cultivates an attitude of generalized suspicion that runs counter to 
the Christian message of redemption. As Wittgenstein notes in the quote 
heading this section, any action done out of good and generous motives can 
also be seen as having its source in some deceitfulness. Viewing oneself 
through the lens of a generalized attitude of suspicion, one will look for, and 
inevitably see signs of this deceitfulness. Now, doubts about the purity of 
one's motives can playa useful role in the life of the Christian, if they are 
the means by which he or she is reminded of the need to trust in God's 
redemptive power. But to play this role, suspicion must operate in the context 
of trust, rather than vice versa. This, I take it, is Wittgenstein's point in saying 
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that" ... only if I were able to submerge myself in religion could these doubts 
be stilled." Religion makes possible a generalized attitude of trust that can 
color even our worst suspicions regarding our deceitfulness with the hues of 
redemption. Without religion, suspicion gains the upper hand; our doubts can 
never be stilled, and our preoccupation with our own sinfulness becomes in 
effect a rejection of redemption. 
By sending us off on an infinite series of critiques of our own critiques, a 
philosophy that teaches us to suspect that which we trust produces the intel-
lectual analog of the self-absorbed sinner. A Christian philosopher is com-
mitted to believing that there is a reality that transcends our own constructions 
of it, and focusing all our energies on deconstructing these constructions 
closes us off from all contact with that reality. But is a philosophy that teaches 
us to trust that which we suspect any better in this regard than one that teaches 
us to suspect that which we trust? Diogenes Allen urges that a committed 
Christian giving the reasons for his or her commitment wants to say that, in 
the end, he or she believes in the Christian story because it is true. 26 If we 
think of philosophy along the lines I suggested when giving my Wittgenste-
in ian reading of the Sophist, it may seem we are making truth a matter of 
agreement. But if I say I am committed to the truth of Christianity, this is 
saying more than that members of the Christian community have agreed to 
treat certain claims about Christ as true. It may be saying at least that much, 
but it is surely also saying more, where this more has something to do with 
a transcendent reality. 
The question then becomes how we are to construe the role of a transcen-
dent reality in our conception of this 'more.' Throughout this paper I have 
simply been granting the postmodern thinker that there is no such thing as 
pure reason that we can employ to get at truth from some transcendent point 
of view. Perhaps this was a mistake, and we need to go back and look at the 
arguments for and against transcendence more carefully. My own inclination, 
however, is to think that the postmodern philosopher is right, and that it is 
part of our being creatures that all our reasonings are inevitably embedded 
in culture and history-and in the attitudinal contexts within which we oper-
ate. Taking a close look at these attitudinal contexts can, I think, provide the 
Christian with a way of rejecting the transcendental pretense without also 
rejecting the Transcendent. As we saw earlier, adopting an attitude of trust 
involves one in a dialectic between the familiar and the unfamiliar that re-
quires being open to having one's expectations transformed by an attentive-
ness to that which is other than oneself. For the Christian, the openness to 
transformation will have to be very radical indeed, for the Christian assumes 
there is an Other whose power to correct and transform goes beyond anything 
we can readily imagine. The Christian is called, in other words, to a very 
deep form of trust. The transformation made possible by this deep trust is not 
a matter of my suddenly ascending to a transcendent point of view as I 
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articulate my Christian commitments, but rather, it is a matter of the Tran-
scendent descending to infuse my utterances in such a way that there is a 
context of agreement between God's will and my own. 
Thus when I say I am committed to Christianity because I believe it is true, 
I am not simply claiming to have come to an agreement with other Christians 
about how I use certain words. On the other hand, when I say the Creed, if 
my words hit the mark, it will not be because this or that proposition can, 
from some neutral perspective of pure reason, be seen to map on to a par-
ticular state of affairs. If my words will hit the mark it will be because the 
whole context of my utterance is in agreement with God's will and infused 
by God's spirit. And, because an important part of the context of utterance is 
my membership in a community of believers, bringing the context of my 
utterance into agreement with God's will requires me to join with other 
believers in the articulation of the Christian language game. Christian phi-
losophers can provide a genuine service in contributing to this articulation-
not by providing transcendent and culturally neutral accounts of God's nature 
which then set the stage for our relationship for God, for that is the way of 
idolatry, but by setting out to clarify and explore our discourse about a 
relationship God has set the stage for by reaching out to us in our very 
particular cultural settings. 
Much of what contemporary Christian philosophers are doing at the mo-
ment amounts to exploring the language game played by the Christian com-
munity, working out the kinks raised as we try to speak about a good God in 
a world where there is much evil, for example, or clarifying our concepts of 
rationality and considering ways in which our standards of rationality might 
be influenced by our Christian commitments and vice versa. This is important 
work, and in itself is enough to guarantee Christian philosophy a future in 
the postmodern age. It seems to me, however, that Christian philosophers can 
and ought to aspire to more. If the vision of postmodern philosophy I have 
been presenting above has any lesson to teach it is that philosophical dis-
course on these matters will serve and be served by generalized attitudes of 
one sort or another. The attitude of radically generalized trust I have been 
associating with a Christian perspective on the world demands a radical 
openness that should push the Christian philosopher beyond dialogue simply 
with other Christians. In that case, the importance of the contributions Christian 
philosophers will make to philosophy in a postmodern age will have less to do 
with the topics they discuss than the attitudes they bring to the discussion. If we 
are persuasive, we will persuade not just by what we say, but by what we show 
in our way of saying it-by our openness to correction, our patience in our 
explorations, our benevolent disputation, and our willingness to trustY 
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